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WAIVER OF DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE BY WIDOW OF
PATIENT
Ernest Warnke, an employee of the McDonough Motors, Inc., was
alleged to have sustained internal injuries while engaged in moving a
large safe pursuant to his employment on February 14, 1931, resulting
in his death August 9, 1932. The Industrial Commission of Ohio
denied the widow compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. She then instituted this action at the trial of which she introduced
the testimony of the attending physician concerning the physical condi-
tion of the decedent both before and after the accident. The Industrial
Commission objected to the admission of such testimony on the ground
that the information received by the physician was in the nature of a
privileged communication and not admissible under Section I 1494 Gen.
Code. The evidence was admitted and the widow obtained judgment.
On appeal it was held that the widow could waive the statutory priv-
ilege and the judgment was affirmed. Industrial Commission v.
T Varnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N.E. (2d) 248, 5 Ohio Op. 505
(1936).
As a general rule "all facts having rational probative value are
admissible unless some specific rule forbids." 1 One of these specific rules
that cut down on admissibility of relevant evidence is that of privilege.
,Vigmore states that to constitute a privilege four things are necessary.
(I) The communication must originate in confidence. (2) Confidence
must be essential to the relation. (3) The relation must be one to be
fostered. (4) The benefit obtained by the secrecy must be greater than
the harm done by the exclusion of relevant testimony.2 In the physician-
patient privilege the second requirement is clearly not met and there is
good reason to believe the same about the fourth.3
There is no physician-patient privilege at common law4 but nearly
three-fourths of the states provide for such a privilege by statute.5 The
privilege is that of the patient and the physician must testify if the
patient is willing for him to do so.' In fact the use of the term "privi-
1Wigmore on Evidence, Second Ed. sec. io.
' Wigmore on Evidence, supra, sec. 2285.
3 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, sec. 2380
4 Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co., 58 Utah 458, i99 Pac. 406
(i9±1); Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind. 1?, 71 N.E. i 9 (1904); Wigmore
on Evidence, supra, sec. 2380; 31 A.L.R. 168.
' Wigmore cites the statutes of thirty-one states, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Porto Rico, Alaska, and the Philippine Islands. Wigmore on Evi-
dence, supra, note to sec. 2380.
' Hirschberg v. Southern Pacific Co., 183 Pac. 141 (1919); Trieber v.
New York and Queen County Railway Co., 149 App. D. 804, 134 N.Y.S.
267 (1912); Parker v. Parker, 78 Nebr. 535, 111 N.W. 119 (1907).
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lege" carries with it the power to elect whether to permit the testimony
or not.' If the law made the doctor incompetent it would be a dis-
qualification and not a privilege.
It is consistently held that the patient may waive the privilege.3
Some state statutes expressly permit the patient to waive it9 but even
where the statute is mandatory in terms, making no express provision
for waiver, the patient is permitted to waive the privilege.'" There is no
such unanimity as to whether or not those who stand in his place may
waive it. The different wording of the various statutes explains in part
the difference of opinion in the several jurisdictions. For example, the
Missouri statute provides that a physician shall be incompetent to
testify;" the California statute, before amendment, provided that a
physician cannot without the consent of his patient testify in a civil
action as to information received, etc.;' 2 the early New York statute
provided that a physician should not testify unless there was an express
waiver by the patient.' 3 Most statutes are variations of the above.
Courts differ as to the interpretation of statutes which are substan-
tially the same. The absolute type of statute providing that a physician
shall not testify or is incompetent to testify, and making no provision
for waiver, was passed in Indiana, 4 Missouri,' 5 Michigan" and Wis-
7 Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 16o, 17 Am. St. Rep. 552 (1889).
s Olson v. Court of Honor, ioo Minn. I17, 117 Am. St. Rep. 676, ilO
N.W. 374 (1907); National Annuity Ass'n. v. McCall, 103 Ark. 201, 146
S.W. 125 (1912); Harrison v. Sutter St. Railway Co., 116 Cal. 356, 47 Pac.
3O9 (1897); Auld v. Cathro, 2o N.D. 461, 128 N.W. 1025 (393o).
9 Olson v. Court of Honor, supra; Harrison v. Sutter St. Railway Co.,
supra; Denning v. Butcher, 91 Ia. 425, 59 N.W. 69 (1894).
'0 Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249, 55 Am. Rep. 358 (3884); Fraser v.
Jennison, 42 Mich. 2o6, 3 N.W. 882 (1879); Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Wiler, IOO Ind. 92, 5o Am. Rep. 769 (1884); Morrisv. Morris, i19 Ind.
341, 23 N.E. 918 (1889). In Thompson v. Ish, supra, it was said, "Notwith-
standing, our statute provides for no exception, still it deals with a privilege,
and it must be taken as established law that the privilege may be waived by
the patient; and we have held that it may be waived by the representative."
"1Mo. Rev. St. 1879, sec. 407 interpreted in Groll v. Tower, supra,
note io and Thompson v. Ish, supra, note 7.
" California C.C.P. 1872, sec. 1881 interpreted in Harrison v. Sutter
Street Railway Co., supra, note 8.
'13 New York Code Civil Procedure sec 834 interpreted in Westover v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 N.Y. 56, 52 Am. Rep. x, I N.E. 104 (I885).
"4 Indiana Rev. St. 1883, sec. 497 interpreted in Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Wiler, supra, note o.
as Mo. Rev. St., supra, note i i.
'
8 Mich. Comp. Laws 5943 interpreted in Fraser v. Jennison, supra,
note 10.
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consin. 7  Indiana and Missouri have steadily held that although no
waiver is mentioned, the patient and his personal representative may
waive the privilege as a privilege of necessity denotes the power to
waive.10 M\'Iichigan early adopted the same view1" but in a later case the
court asserted that the privilege was personal to the patient."0 Such an
assertion was unnecessary for the decision as the question was merely
whether the physician could waive the privilege. 1 Later an amendment
to the statute provided that in a probate issue the heirs at law shall be
deemed personal representatives of the patient for purposes of waiving the
statute. 2 Wisconsin early adopted the opposite view and held the priv-
ilege to be personal to the patient.23 A statutory change later permitted
waiver by the personal representative of the patient. 4 The Arkansas
statute reads as though the privilege belongs to the physician but the
court has interpreted the statute to mean that the privilege is that of the
patient and waiver is possible by the patient or if he is dead by his per-
sonal representative."3
The most common type of statute provides that the physician can-
not testify without the consent of the patient. Nearly all states having
such statutes permit waiver of the privilege by the representative of the
patient."z A very few of these states have held the privilege to be per-
sonal to the patient. North Dakota has steadily so held. California
17 Wisconsin St. 1898 sec. 4075 interpreted in In Re Will of Hunt, I122
Wis. 460, OO N.W. 874.
1$ Groll v. Tower, supra, note io; Thompson v. Iss, supra, note 7; The
Masonic Mutual Benefit Ass'n. v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 40 Am. Rep. 295
(188i); Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, supra, note io; Morris v.
Morris, supra, note IO.
11' Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 2o6, 3 N.W. 88z (1879).
20 Storrs v. Scougale, 48 Mich. 387, 1z N.W. 502 (1882).
21 31 A.L.R. 168.
2" Mich. 5 How. Stat. (2d) sec. 12826. See In Re Oldenberg, 177
Mich. 150, 14z N.W. 1076 (1913).
23 In Re Will of Hunt, 122 Wis. 460, 1oo N.W. 874 (1904); Casson v.
Schoenfeld, 166 Wis. 401, 166 N.W. z3 (x918); Maine v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N.W. 749 (1920).24 Estate of Gallun, 215 Wis. 314 0934).
25National Annuity Ass'n. v. McCall, 103 Ark. 2oi, 146 S.W. 125
(1912).
""Denning v. Butcher, 91 Ia. 425, 59 N.W. 69 (1894); Winters v.
Winters, Io Ia. 53, 71 N.W. 184 (1897); Olson v. Court of Honor
(Minn.), supra note 8; Schornick v. Schornick, 22o Pac. 397, Ariz. (1923) ;
Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 237, 116 Pac. 898 (1911); Flack v. Brewster,
107 Kan. 63, 19o Pac. 616 (I92O); Parker v. Parker, 78 Nebr. 535, 111
N.W. 119 (1907); Grieve v. Howard, 54 Utah 225, 18o Pac. 423 (1919).27 Auld v. Cathro, 2o N.D. 461, 128 N.W. Io25 (191o).
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early adopted this view because of the belief that its statute was similar
to the New York statute when in reality the two were different.S
Later a statute was passed changing the rule in California and bringing
it in line with the majority." The Mississippi statute provides that a
physician shall not testify except at the instance of his patient.3" Under
this statute Mississippi holds that the privilege is personal with the
patient."'
Formerly the New York statute provided that the physician could
not testify unless there was an express waiver by the patient. Under
this statute it is more difficult to permit the representative to waive the
privilege and New York early came to the conclusion that the privilege
was personal.3 2 This was changed in 1893 by statutory modification
expressly permitting waiver by the representative of the patient.3
A fourth type of statute is in force in Ohio and Wyoming." The
Ohio statute provides, "The following persons shall not testify in certain
respects: - -a physician, concerning a communication made to him by
his patient in that relation, or his advice to his patient. But the attorney
or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient; and if
the client or patient voluntarily testifies, the attorney or physician may
be compelled to testify on the same subject."3 " It was held in Swetlamd
v. Miles that the privilege is personal to the patient and that it can not
be waived by the personal representative or heir because when certain
exceptions to a statute are named they are exclusive and others may
not be read in by the court.3 The majority of the court in the principal
case holds that the statute in listing the two exceptions implied that the
patient would be alive and is silent as to the result if he were dead.
This reasoning seems open to question. A comparison of the Ohio
statute with other statutes shows that while some of them do not men-
tion waiver and others expressly provide for waiver by the patient, the
2 Harrison v. Sutter Street Railway Co., i16 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. io19
(I897),
29 Cal. St. 1933 c. 536.
30 Miss. Code 19o6, sec. 3695.
"
1McCaw v. Turner, iz6 Miss. z6o, 88 So. 705 (1921).
32 Westover v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 N.Y. 56, 5z Am. Rep. i, I N.E.
104 (1885); Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N.Y. 573, 57 Am. Rep. 770, 9 N.E.
320 (1886).
" Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 834; Pringle v. Burroughs, 70 App.
Div. 12, 74 N.Y. Supp. 1055 (19oz); Appeal, ioo App. Div. 366, 91 N.Y.
Supp. 750 (905); Affirmed, 185 N.Y. 375, 78 N.E. 150 (19o6).
4 Ohio Gen. Code 11494; Wyoming Rev. Stats. 1931, sec. 89-I703-C
St. 1920 sec. 58o6.
35 Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 11494.3
1Swetland v. Miles, ioi Ohio St. 501, 13o N.E. 22 (1920).
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Ohio statute expressly names two instances in which the patient may
waive the privilege. It is difficult to reconcile the holding that the
widow could waive the privilege with the peculiar terms of the Ohio
statute. If other exceptions were intended it would seem that they
would have been specifically stated. The majority opinion in the prin-




REAL PROPERTY-LEASES-ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF LEASE-
ATTACHMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
A lease agreement was typewritten upon ten separate pages and
firmly bound and fastened together by brass rivets. It was contended
that the lease agreement was ineffective to convey the leasehold estate
recited in the agreement because the acknowledgment was upon a sepa-
rate page, contrary to the requirements of Section 85io, Gen. Code.
This section provides that a qualified officer "shall certify the acknowl-
edgment on the same sheet on which the instrument is written or printed,
,nd subscribe his name thereto." In this lease, the beginning of the
certificate of acknowledgment appeared on the ninth page of the instru-
ment following part of a sentence of the lease and the signatures of the
parties and witnesses. The remaining portion of the certificate of ac-
knowledgment with the notary's signature appeared on the tenth and
last sheet. Held, that the instrument in question constituted a valid lease.
Rollman & Sons Co. v. The ulaska Realty Co.- 52.Ohio App. 166, 4
Ohio Op. 386 (1936).
It was the opinion of the court that the object of Section 85 10 is to
prevent mistake and fraud, and to give greater certainty to tides within
the state. The court placed considerable emphasis upon the fashion in
which the ten sheets comprising the instrument were bound together by
brass rivets, so constructed that when once drawn through the paper and
compressed they presented a fastening which must be destroyed if re-
moved and which could not be detached without leaving evidence of
mutilation. The court also emphasized the fact that a page could not
be inserted in the collection without first removing the rivets and re-
ferred to these sheets as forming "one instrument of ten pages."
One of the earliest cases in point is Winkler v. Higgins, 9 Ohio St.
599 (85). In that case the court held that a certificate of acknowl-
